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Rate-based emissions policies (like tradable performance standards) ﬁx average emissions in-
tensity, while cap-and-trade policies ﬁx total emissions. This paper shows that unfettered trade
between rate-based and cap-and-t r a d ep r o g r a m sa l w a y sr a i s e sc o m b i n e de m i s s i o n s ,e x c e p tw h e n
product markets are related in particular ways. Gains from trade are fully passed on to consumers
in the rate-based sector, resulting in more output and greater emissions allocations. We consider a
range of policy options to offset the expansion, including unilateral ones when jurisdictional differ-
ences require. The cap-and-trade jurisdiction could impose an “exchange rate” to adjust for relative
permit values, but marginal abatement cost equalization is sacriﬁced. Still, that jurisdiction may
prefer adjusted trade over tightening their own cap, which transfers away rents. Although the rate-
based sector would have to implement the switch to output-based allocation of a cap, its surplus
would be higher than with adjusted trade, which is also preferred to no trade. The cap-and-trade
sector would also be better off. Thus, a range of combinations of tighter allocations could improve
situations in both sectors with trade, while holding emissions constant.
Key Words: emissionstrading, permit allocation, tradableperformancestandards, climate, green-
house gases
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Frame w o r kC o n v e n t i o no nC l i m a t eC h a n g e ,p a r t i c i -
pating countries agreed to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions to target levels generally below
1990 emissions. To achieve their individual targets, the signatory countries are considering a di-
versemixofpolicies, but emissions trading isexpectedtobeacentralcomponent ofoverallclimate
policies. Even among tradable emissions permit policies, diversity exists. Some target emissions
intensity, such as with tradable performance standards, which ﬁx the average emissions rate for key
sectors but allow their total emissions to vary. Others ﬁxac a po nt h eo v e r a l le m i s s i o n sf o rd e s i g -
nated participants in the permit program. Although countries may initially tailor individual trading
policies for speciﬁc sectors, ultimately the hope is to take advantage of potential gains by allowing
trade across sectors and across countries. An important question then arises: What happens when a
cap-and-trade system of emissions permits is opened to trading with a system regulating emissions
intensity?
Cap-and-trade programs for CO2 are already being prepared in several countries, and one is
being designed for the European Union overall, with the ﬁrst trading period to begin in 2005.
In the EU proposal, while absolute emissions targets are required for covered sectors overall,1
“relative targets” of emissions intensity are allowed for individual industries, as long as they are
convertedtoquantitiesinagivenperiodforthepurposesofthetradingcap(COM2001). emissions
0FischerisaFellowatResourcesfortheFuture, 1616PStreetNW,WashingtonDC20036(email: ﬁscher@rff.org).
All errors and opinions remain the responsibility of the author.
1The EU current directive proposal begins with a cap on CO2 emissions for large sources in certain energy-
producing or energy-intensive sectors: combustion installations, reﬁneries, metal and mineral industries, and paper
and pulp mills. Together, these sectors are estimated to account for about 46% of total CO2 emissions in 2010.
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rate targets are also already in use as part of climate policy in several countries. Alongside the
Climate Change Levy in the United Kingdom are negotiated agreements that offer 80% rebates
to most manufacturing sectors in exchange for specify energy-per-unit-of-output targets for the
next 10 years (DEFRA 2001). Another 34 companies have accepted ﬁxed targets; they may trade
among one another and sell to the rate-based sectors, but not buy from them. The Netherlands is
separating its energy-intensive sectors into trade-sensitive ones, which wi l lb es u b j e c tt oat r a d a b l e
performance standard, and less exposed ones, which will be subject to a cap-and-trade program
(Kuik at al. 2002). Many countries also have portfolio standards for renewable energy generation,
which aresimilartointensitytargets.2 The United States, having rejected the Kyoto Protocol, plans
to target emissions intensity instead, though in a voluntary framework.
The reasons for preferring a rate-based policy are equally diverse. The initial intent may be
to mitigate cost uncertainty (Kolstadt 2002). Motivations might also be political or distributional.
An emissions intensity target may be easier to negotiate with industry than a ﬁxed allocation or
an auction, since it encourages growth. And a rate-based allocation may not need special arrange-
ments for new participants and participants that cease operation. However, if the emissions cap for
the trading program is not ﬁxed and the country (or group of countries) has an absolute emissions
limit, a rate-based allocation may impose a larger reduction burden on sources outside the rate-
based trading program. In general, even within as i n g l es e c t o r ,i ft h eg o a li st oa c h i e v eac e r t a i n
level of emissions, rate-based allocations are inefﬁcient (Fischer 2001). Furthermore, when the
incidence of the allocation subsidy to consumers and intermediate input providers is taken into
account, producers may not be better off with output-based allocation than with auctioned permits
(Burtraw et al. 2002). However, a rate-based allocation strategy may be justiﬁed in certain situa-
tions, such as if close competitors with similar emission proﬁles cannot be regulated (Bernard et
al. 2002). In this case, the output support implicit in the rate-based allocation can mitigate the
loss of competitiveness and subsequent emissions leakage to ﬁrms outside the regulation’s juris-
2These countries include Australia, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom, as well as at least 10 states in the United States. (Source: Union of Concerned Scientists).3
diction.3 Another general equilibrium argument that favors output-allocated over “grandfathered”
permits (gratis lump-sum allocations) involves the interaction with other taxes in the economy:
a large body of literature indicates that environmental policies that raise the prices of goods can
exacerbate preexisting distortions in the economy.4
In this paper, we focus on the question of integrating trading programs, evaluating the impacts
of different strategies on prices, production, emissions, and rents. To remain agnostic about the
speciﬁc reasons for the rate-based policy, we ignore the general equilibrium effects or political
economy factors that might motivate the policy choice as beyond the scope of this paper. The
intent is to outline the important component effects of integration, acknowledging that a complete
welfare analysis would require speciﬁc knowledge of the underlying market failures that make the
rate-based program an appropriate second-best policy response in the ﬁrst place. To illustrate these
effects, section 2 presents a simple, partial equilibrium model and analyzes the fundamental incen-
tives for each of two sectors, one with an emissions cap, the other with an intensity target. Section
3 evaluates the effects of allowing free trade between the two sectors. Section 4 then weighs dif-
ferent policy options for holding total emissions constant under trade, taking distributional effects
into consideration.
We ﬁnd that allowing unfettered trade between rate-based and cap-and-trade programs always
raises combined emissions—regardless of the direction of trade—when the product markets are
independent. In the rate-based sector, no permit rents exist, since all cost savings are passed along
to consumers. The gains from trade in the permit market then lead to lower prices and expanded
production in that sector; that increased output brings with it additional permit allocations, which
in turn expand the overall cap of allocated emissions. In certain situations when product markets
are interrelated, however, allowing trade in permits can cause emissions to fall. An example would
be if the two sectors produce substitute goods, and trade in permits lowers prices for the cap-and-
trade sector; if that sector becomes relatively more competitive, causing demand for the rate-based
3Kuik et al. (2002) ﬁnd a signiﬁcant welfare loss for the Netherlands when the trade-exposed sectors are subject to
a cap rather than intensity targets because of the loss in competitiveness.
4See, e.g., Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994), Goulder (1995), Goulder et al. (1997), Fullerton and Metcalf (1997).4
sector’s products to fall, output and thereby emissions allocations to that sector could contract.
Thus, a comprehensive analysis of integrating particular regulated sectors needs to account for
their product market interactions.
Sincetotal emissionsrisewithoutput intherate-basedsector, somesortofcompensatingpolicy
is necessary to allow trade but hold emissions constant. If both sectors fall in the same jurisdiction,
the regulator can presumably choose among tightening the cap, tightening the standard, seeking
outside offsets, or some combination. However, if the cap-and-trade sector lies in a separate ju-
risdiction, one that holds stronger preferences about holding emissions ﬁxed, it may need to seek
unilateral adjustment actions to trade in permits. Some policy options include taxing the output of
the rate-based sector to offset the change in allocation, imposing an “exchange rate” for relative
permit values, or tightening its own cap. A tax on output keeps abatement incentives efﬁcient but
may be difﬁcult to impose across borders, since it must apply to goods trade rather than to per-
mit trade. Adjustments to permit exchanges change the ratio of emissions that a rate-based sector
permit can offset for (or with) capped sector permits; they can be more easily imposed on cross-
border permit transactions, but marginal abatement cost equalization is sacriﬁced. Tightening its
own emissions cap would preserve both efﬁciency and constant emissions; however, the loss in
rents from the lower allocation may mean that total surplus in that sector is lower than with the less
efﬁcient, adjusted permit trade. On the other hand, compared with adjusted trade, the rate-based
s e c t o rw o u l dp r e f e rt os w i t c ho ni t so w nt oo u t p u t-based allocation of a cap equal to its initial
emissions (or, equivalently, tighten its standard to hold emissions constant). In their case, the gains
from unrestrained trade outweigh the reduction in allocation, resulting in higher surplus for that
sector. The cap-and-trades e c t o rw o u l da l s ob e n e ﬁt from such a switch. Thus, this mechanism is
likely to be preferred when rate-based allocation remains important for this sector, though a range
of mutually beneﬁcial adjustments to allocations exists. We conclude by noting that the speciﬁc
characteristics of the sectors, the broader economic context, and the underlying motivations of the
regulators will be important for understanding the full implications of the incentives created when
tradable emissions permit programs with different designs are integrated.5
2M o d e l
The simplest form that captures the main aspects of the problem is a partial equilibrium model
of two sectors, each with a representative ﬁrm. Each ﬁrm is assumed to be a price taker both in
product and in emissions markets, but trade between them occurs only in the latter. This situation
could arise if the sectors represent different industries or are located in different countries, or both.
For example, one country could set a performance standard for its energy-intensive industry, while
another sets a cap on CO2 emissions from its electricity sector.
Total emissions in each sector Ei are the product of the emissions rate µi and total output Qi.
Marginal costs of production for ﬁrm i, represented by ci(·), are constant in output but a decreasing
function of the emissions rate, up to some ﬁnite natural emissions rate µ0
i: ci(µ) > 0, c0
i(µ) ≤ 0,
c00
i(µ) > 0,a n dc0
i(µ0
i)=0 . This formulation essentially represents the long-run average cost of
production for the industry, recognizing that it must be higher when emissions intensity is lower.
The model is one of partial equilibrium, as each sector is assumed to face exogenous demand
functions. In the base case, consumer demand in each sector is assumed to be independent of the
other sector and income effects. Then demand is a simple, declining function of consumption of
that sector’s product price (Qi(Pi)), and we candeﬁne consumer surplus as CSi(Pi)=
R ∞
Pi Q(s)ds,
the main point being that it is also declining with the price. However, we will also relax the
assumption of independent markets to discuss the effects of cross-price interactions when the two
products are substitutes or complements.
This basic formalization is attractive in its transparency. Perfect competition ensures that prices
equal marginal costs in output and emissions markets. All abatement costs are evident in the prod-
uct market, in the form of increased production costs and avoided consumption. Total surplus is the
sum of consumer surplus and producer proﬁts, which in this case of constant marginal production
costs will simply equal consumer surplus and lump-sum allocated emissions rents. Although these
assumptions are somewhat restrictive, particularly with respect to normative welfare analysis, the
main intuition regarding incentive effects will hold in a broader model.6
2.1 Cap-and-Trade System
Our ﬁrst system is a cap-and-trade system (CAT), in which overall industry emissions are ﬁxed at
¯ E.E a c hﬁrm must buy permits to the extent its emissions exceed its ﬁxed allocation, ¯ A,a n dc a n
sell any extra allowances if its emissions fall below. Let t1 be the market price of permits. For our
representative, perfectly competitive ﬁrm, proﬁt sa r er e v e n u e sl e s sp r o d u c t i o nc o s t sl e s st h ev a l u e
of net permit purchases:
π1 =( P1 − c1(µ1) − t1µ1)Q1 + t1 ¯ A. (1)
The ﬁrm will lower its emissions rate from the natural rate until the marginal cost of emissions







Meanwhile, in the competitive industry equilibrium, the output price must equal the marginal








In equilibrium, supply must equal demand, so output levels are determined by the quantity de-
manded at the equilibrium price: Q∗
1 = Q1(P∗
1). The equilibrium permit price is such that 2 and 3
hold and the cap binds: µ∗
1Q∗
1 = ¯ E.
In this model, with constant marginal costs, ﬁrm proﬁts—excluding emissions rents—are zero.
Thus, producer surplus equals the value of the allocation, t1 ¯ A. For simplicity, we will assume
that ¯ A = ¯ E, recognizing that these rents need not necessarily be distributed to the ﬁrms, but
that the total value will not be affected by changes in the lump-sum distribution. Total surplus is
TS1 = CS1(P∗
1)+t1 ¯ E. Since the allocation remains constant, the distributional effects of trade
depend on the change in consumer surplus and the change in the value of the lump-sum emissions
allocation via the permit price change.7
2.2 Tradable Performance Standard
The second system is a tradable performance standard (TPS), also known as a rate-based emissions
permit program, which ﬁxes the average emissions intensity rather than capping total emissions.
To the extent a ﬁrm produces with emissions rates below the standard, that ﬁrm creates permits that
it can sell; to the extent the ﬁrm produces with above-average emissions, it must purchase permits
to cover the gap. The subsequent equilibrium determines the price of emissions and total amount
of emissions, such that the industry emissions rate average equals the performance standard. This
policy represents a form of output-based rebating of emissions rents, combining a price on emis-
sions (in the form of permit liabilities) with a subsidy to output (in the form of the rate-based
allocation).
Let t2 represent the price of emissions permits in the TPS program. The ﬁrm must buy permits
t ot h ee x t e n ti te m i t sm o re than the standard, ¯ µ, which determines the industry’s average emissions
rate. In other words, the ﬁrm pays an emissions tax of t2µ2Q2 and receives a subsidy equal to the
average value of emissions embodied in its output, t2¯ µQ2.
Consider our representative, perfectly competitive ﬁrm with constant marginal costs. Its proﬁts
now equal total revenues from the sale of output less the costs of production, less emissions costs
net of the rebated subsidy:
π2 =( P2 − c2(µ2) − t2(µ2 − ¯ µ))Q2. (4)
Maximizing proﬁts, the ﬁrm lowers its emissions rate until the marginal cost per unit of output






Similarly, the equilibrium output price must equal the marginal costs of an additional unit,8







2 − ¯ µ). (5)
In a closed equilibrium, compliance with the performance standard implies µ∗
2 =¯ µ;c o r r e -
spondingly, the permit price equals the marginal abatement cost at that standard: t2 = −c0
2(¯ µ).
Furthermore, the marginal permit price just equals the marginal subsidy per unit of output, so
the equilibrium output price just equals marginal production costs, much as it would with no reg-
ulation. However, compliance with the performance standard raises marginal production costs
compared with the no-regulation case (superscript 0); that is, P2 = c2(¯ µ) >c 2(µ0
2)=P0
2.
Total production in the market equilibrium is determined by consumer demand. Let Q2 =
Q2(P∗
2)=Q2(c2(¯ µ)). The higher price resulting from the regulation corresponds to a lower level
of output than in the absence of regulation; however, since the price does not include the marginal
environmental cost of the emissions embodied in remaining production, output will be higher than
with a cap-and-trade policy achieving the same intensity (or, equivalently in this case, emissions
price). As a consequence, given an equivalent emissions rate (or permit price), total emissions will
be higher than with CAT. The dual to this result is that, to achieve the same total level of emissions,
the emissions rate must be lower in a rate-based system to offset the lesser conservation incentive
compared with the CAT system.
The assumption of constant marginal production costs means that all cost changes—including
the value of the rate-based allocation—are passed on to consumers. Thus, ﬁrm proﬁts are always
zero, no emissions rents exist, and total surplus equals consumer surplus: TS2 = CS2(P∗
2).
3 Trade between Programs
Allowing trade between a traditional CAT program and a rate-based emissions program will pro-
vide for an equalization of marginal abatement costs, at least with respect to emissions rate reduc-
tions. If there is a difference in the permit prices without trade, the sector with the higher autarky9
price will want to do less abatement and instead buy permits from the sector with the lower price,
which in turn will reduce emissions to be able to sell more permits. The resulting equilibrium per-
mit price with trade will lie somewhere in between the no-trade prices, where the marginal costs
of control are equalized.
Since the allocation tot h eC A Ts e c t o ri sﬁxed, the change in joint emissions equals the change
in the allocation of permits to ther a t e - b a s e ds e c t o r .T h ec h a n g ei n that allocation depends on the
change in output in that sector, which in turn depends on how prices change.
Proposition 1 Trade in emissions between a performance standard and a cap-and-trade program
always lowers the output price in the sector with the performance standard.
Proof. Let t be the market price of emissions with trade and µ0
2 be the emissions rate that satisﬁes
−c0
2(µ0
2)=t.B yt h ed e ﬁnition of proﬁt maximization, if µ0
2 is optimal, it must be that costs are
lower than with ¯ µ: c2(µ0
2)+t(µ0
2 − ¯ µ) <c 2(¯ µ). Accordingly, product prices are lower (P0
2 <P ∗
2).
In other words, gains from trade arise from the potential for cost savings. Since no emissions
rents exist in the rate-based sector, all the savings are passed on to consumers. In our base case,
when demand is independent, the quantity demanded and produced increases with the price fall
(Q0
2 > Q2). Correspondingly, the permit allocation and thereby total combined emissions will
increase by ¯ µ(Q0
2−Q2). Thus, joint emissions always increase with permit trade, regardless of the
direction of trade between the sectors.
To explore this result further, suppose ﬁrst that the autarky price is higher in the TPS sector:
t2 >t 1. In the trading equilibrium, the rate-based sector imports permits fromthe cappedsector. In
the capped sector, emissions rates fall until marginal costs equal the new price: −c0
1(µ0
1)=t>t 1.
Total emissions in that sector fall by the amount sold to the rate-based sector. The higher marginal
cost of control plus higher permit costs mean output prices must rise as well. However, the value
of the initial permit allocation rises as well, raising overall surplus in that sector.
In the TPS sector, emissions rates rise until marginal costs equal the new price: −c0
2(µ0
2)=
t<t 2. With a higher emissions rate, direct production costs fall; however, the price of output now10
reﬂects a net tax on the embodied emissions: P2(Q0
2)=c2(µ0
2)+t(µ0
2−¯ µ). Still, we can be assured
that this price is lower than c2(¯ µ), and that the corresponding increase in output expands overall
emissions. Total emissions in this sector then change by µ0
2Q0
2−¯ µQ2; however, net purchases from
the capped sector equal (µ0
2 − ¯ µ)Q0
2. In other words, as abatement and thereby production costs
fall with trade in permits, the rate-based sector is allowed to expand. However, it is not required to
purchase permits for all of its additional emissions, just those above the standard.
Suppose now that the autarky price is higher in the CAT sector: t2 <t 1. In this case, the TPS
sector exports permits to the capped sector. In the capped sector, emissions rates rise until marginal
costs equal the new equilibrium price: −c0
1(µ00
1)=t<t 1. Total emissions in that sector rise by the
amount purchased from the rate-based sector. Cost savings are passed on to consumers, and the
value of emissions rents falls with the market price.
In the TPS sector, emissions rates fall until marginal costs equal the new price: −c0
2(µ00
2)=
t>t 2. With a lower emissions rate, direct production costs rise; however, the price of output
now reﬂects a net subsidy: P2(Q00
2)=c2(µ00
2)+t(µ00
2 − ¯ µ). The net change in emissions equals
µ00
2Q00
2 − ¯ µQ2, but net sales to the capped sector equal (¯ µ−µ00
2)Q00
2. Thus, total combined emissions
increase by the sum ¯ µ(Q00
2 − Q2).
In other words, the net subsidy from having the emissions rate below the standard must out-
weigh the direct cost increase. Accordingly, trade lowers costs and raises output in the rate-based
sector. Total emissions in this sector may rise or fall, depending on the output effect relative to the
rate reduction. However, total joint emissions necessarily increase, since the rate-based sector’s
allocation increases with its output, while the capped sector’s allocation remains ﬁxed.
3.1 Caveat
An important caveat to this analysis applies when demand for the two products is not independent
but rather interdependent. In the case of strong substitutes (or complements), trade in permits can
reduce total emissions if it makes the CAT sector product relatively more competitive (or more
expensive). Since competitiveness effects are a common rationale for rate-based mechanisms, this11
case merits concern. Although the justiﬁcation is typically that the important competitors are less
stringently regulated, it is possible that for strategic or other reasons, one sector has a TPS while
its competitor (or complementary sector) has a CAT requirement. Without having to model a
complete general equilibrium, we can understand under what conditions trade between a CAT and
a TPS system could lower emissions. Since the change in total emissions in the two programs
depends on output in the TPS sector, the question is whether quantity demanded in that sector
could fall with the changes in the competitive market prices.
Consider consumer demand in the TPS sector as being a function not only of its own price,
but also of the price in the CAT sector: Q2(P2,P 1). Then we can write the change in that sector’s









where η22 is the own-price elasticity (assumed to be negative) and η21 is the cross-price elasticity.
Proposition 1 showed that dP2 < 0, regardless of the direction of trade. On the other hand, the
sign of dP1 depends on whether trade increases or decreases the price of permits compared with
no trade. Thus, we can identify two potential cases in which Q2 could fall, both requiring that the
cross-price effects dominate the own-price effects.
First, if the goods are complements (η21 < 0), then if t2 >t>t 1,t h er i s ei nP1 could
drive down Q2. This case might occur if the CAT sector provides an important input to the TPS
sector,5 or if both provide inputs to another sector, such as electricity generation and steel to a
manufacturing industry. For example, if the incr e a s e dv a l u eo fe m i s s i o n su n d e rt r a d ei sf u l l y
passed forward in electricity prices, consumers of that input could also demand less of other inputs
like steel, even if their prices are somewhat lower.
Second, if the goods are substitutes (η21 > 0), then if t2 <t<t 1, the fall in P1 could
drive down Q2. An example of this situation would be if the sectors produce similar goods in
different countries. If, say, country 1 regulates its paper mills with a CAT, they are relatively less
competitive in autarky than mills regulated with a TPS in country 2. If trade results in lower permit
5Although in this example we should note that the costs would also be correlated.12
prices for country 1 and its mills become relatively more competitive, their output could expand at
the expense of output in country 2.
It is indeed possible for the cross-price effects to be bigger even if own-price elasticities are
stronger, since the output price in the CAT sector is more sensitive to permit price changes than
the price in the TPS sector.6 Correspondingly, while output in the CAT sector should respond as
before, in the opposite direction of its own-price change, output in the TPS sector may behave
differently. Thus, to understand the implications of integrating permit trade between a CAT and a
TPS system, it is important to take into account the trade relationships between the two product
markets as well. This said, for the rest of the paper we will proceed with the assumption that
own-price effects always dominate.
4 Equalizing Trade between Programs
Since Kyoto targets are ﬁxed caps, policy designers might prefer to keep total combined emissions
from expanding. One option would be to buy offsets outside the two programs. For example, a
country with a rate-based policy could seek credits from projects within the Clean Development
Mechanism. However, policy designers might prefer to keep the adjustment mechanism within the
tradingprograms. Obviously, themoststraightforwardwaytoensurethatisforthesecond sectorto
adopt a cap. Otherwise, some tightening of the emissions standard and/or the emissions cap would
be required in the new trading equilibrium. But the two sectors may fall under different regulatory
jurisdictions—like different countries—with their own priorities. If the rate-based country does
not wish to tighten its standard, can the cap-and-trade country design a tax that neutralizes the
effects of rate-based allocations? Would this be a credible and desirable alternative to tightening
its own cap? Furthermore, facing adjustments to permit trade, would the rate-based sector be better
off switching to a cap with output-based allocation of emissions permits?
6For example, if we consider small changes from the autarky permit price we see dP2/dt1 = µ∗
1 while dP2/dt2 =
µ∗
2 − ¯ µ =0 . Note that since costs are minimized with respect to emissions rates at the autarky prices, small changes
in µ do not affect output prices.13
4.1 Taxing Trade
One way for the CAT regulator to offset the effects of trade on emissions is by imposing a tax
on the output of the TPS sector equal to the cost differential: τ = c2(¯ µ) − c2(µ2) − t(µ2 − ¯ µ).
That would hold output, and thereby emissions, constant in sector 2. It also retains most of the
output support from the rate-based allocation. However, this adjustment may be difﬁcult if the
permit trade involves separate countries. The CAT policy country could then only hope to tax the
foreign output it imports itself, and even that policy is likely to be restricted by multilateral trade
agreements.7
T h eo t h e rt a xo p t i o nw o u l db et oi n t r o d u c eap r i c ew e d g eb e t w e e nt h ep r i c eo fp e r m i t sa th o m e
andabroad. Althoughanexportortransactiontaxwouldreducetradeanddampentheopportunities
for emissions expansion, it would not affect the variability of allocation. For the same reasons as in
the free-trade scenario, any worthwhile trade will allow sector 2 to expand its allocation. Thus, to
ensure that trade holds emissions constant, the adjustment policy must offset the allocation effect.
In other words, the tax would need to expropriate permits rather than just a fee.
A permit exchange rate would create a wedge between the number of permits traded rather than
between their prices. A policy regulating trade in permits across jurisdictions could be imposed
unilaterally, regardless of the direction of trade. The policymaker governing the CAT sector would
make rules regarding the relative value of the permits being traded. She would make adjustments
in terms of the rate of offset (or impose an expropriation rate for cross-border trade) to prevent
joint emissions from expanding. However, a drawback of this regime is that marginal abatement
costs will not be equalized.
With trade adjusted by an exchange rate (denoted with superscript A), the TPS sector would
have to buy (or would be able to sell) α permits from the CAT sector for each unit it emits above
(below) its average. With trade, its marginal costs of reducing the emissions rate will equal the
adjusted price of permits: −c0
2(µA
2 )=αtA,w h e r etA is the market price received (or paid) by the
CAT sector. Since α 6=1 , the TPS sector has different incentives to abate under trade than the
7See Fischer et al. (2002).14
CAT sector, which equalizes marginal costs of emissions reduction to the unadjusted permit price.
This disparity also creates room for corner solutions with respect to emissions abatement: if the
adjustment factor is higher than the autarky price differential, no trade will occur.
If it does occur, trade can only lower costs compared with autarky behavior, as shown in the
previous propositions. Output t h e nr i s e sa st h ep r i c ef a l l s :P2(QA
2 )=c2(µA
2 )+αtA(µA
2 − ¯ µ) <
c2(¯ µ). Total emissions in this sector will then change by µA
2 QA
2 −¯ µQ2. The adjustment factor must
be set such that adjusted permits sold equal the change in emissions in the cap-and-trade sector,
which must also equal the actual change in emissions in the rate-based sector:
α(µ
A
2 − ¯ µ)Q
A








2 − ¯ µQ2.




2 − ¯ µQ2
(µA
2 − ¯ µ)QA
2
.
In other words, the country with the CAT sector expropriates the share 1−α of the (µA
2 −¯ µ)QA
2
permits traded, or ¯ µ(QA
2 − Q2) permits, representing the change in the total allocation. Since
QA
2 > Q2, regardless of the direction of trade, this amount is always positive. If tA >t 2,t h e n
µA
2 < ¯ µ and α < 1. This means in turn that the TPS sector will have less incentive to abate when
it is exporting permits, since −c0
2(µA
2 )=αtA < −c0
1(µA
1 )=tA.I fi n s t e a dtA <t 2,t h e nµA
2 > ¯ µ
and α > 1. This means in turn that sector 2 will have more incentive to abate when it is importing
permits, since −c0
2(µA
2 )=αtA > −c0
1(µA
1 )=tA. In both cases, then, some of the potential gains
from trade are forgone to keep total emissions stable.
4.2 Output-Allocated Permits
Another option would be for sector 2 to switch to a ﬁxed emissions cap but use output-based
allocation (OBA) of the emissions permits. OBA is another type of rate-based allocation, but the
average allocation is endogenous, rather than equal to a ﬁxed emissions intensity. Output-based15
allocations are part of the proposed CO2 trading program designs for several countries, including
France, Switzerland, and Canada. The last is particularly concerned about limiting the adverse
impacts on industries that compete with ﬁrms in the neighboring United States, which has not
committed to a national greenhouse gas emissions limit. Output-based allocations have also been
proposed in the United States for NOx emissions allowances within some northeastern states.
Let the OBA program be represented with superscript B. In autarky, a policy allocating ﬁxed
emissions based on output shares would be equivalent to the tradable performance standard. To
illustrate, consider a cap of ¯ µQ2 permits that is allocated among program participants according
to output shares. The assumption of perfect competition implies that the individual ﬁrm does not
perceive an impact on the industry average allocation of its own production behavior. Thus, each
ﬁrm expects to get an allocation ¯ e per unit of its output. The proﬁts for our representative ﬁrm are
then revenues less production costs less the value of net permit purchases:
π
B
2 =( P2 − c2(µ) − tB(µ − ¯ e))Q. (6)
As with the other policies, the ﬁrm equalizes the marginal cost of emissions rate reduction with
the marginal price of emissions: −c0
2(µ)=tB. And the equilibrium output price equals marginal







2 − ¯ e). (7)
In equilibrium, the average allocation will equal the emissions cap divided by total production
in the sector:
¯ e ≡ ¯ µQ2/Q
B
2 . (8)
If the emissions market is restricted to this sector, the average permit allocation will equal the
average emissions rate, and ¯ e = µB =¯ µ, tB = t2,a n dQB
2 = Q2. However, in the case of
emissions trading with other sectors, it is an important distinction that the subsidy is a function not16
of the industry average emissions rate but rather of the average allocation. By deﬁnition, allowing
trade between two capped markets has no impact on total emissions. It does, however, reallocate
the costs and subsidies.
With trade, both sectors will equalize the marginal cost of abatement to the new market price
of permits: −c0
1(µB
1 )=t = −c0
2(µB
2 ). As with the previous versions, trade can only lower pro-
duction costs. If sector 2 chooses the autarky emissions rate, then ¯ e =¯ µ,a n dP2 = c(¯ µ) applies.8
Therefore, if another emissions rate is optimal, costs must be lower. Thus, output rises with trade
(QB
2 > Q2), regardless of the direction of the exchange, and the average allocation is diluted:
¯ e<¯ µ.
It is also straightforward to see here that an equivalent adjustment policy would be for the rate-
based regulator to tighten the performance standard from ¯ µ to ¯ e. This would lead to the equivalent
allocation and equilibrium under trade. Thus, the regulator should also prefer this tighter standard
to facing adjusted trade or no trade, since costs are lower. The main difference is, of course, that the
OBA allocation is endogenous and ensures the cap is always met, whereas if costs are uncertain,
the revised standard may not accurately adjust for changes in emissions.
From the previous analysis, we know that if trade occurs, prices in sector 2 are lower than with




2. However, we can also show that PB
2 <P A
2 . Therefore, if
the regulator of sector 2 is concerned with consumer surplus, he will prefer output-based allocation
of a cap equal to autarky emissions over adjusted trade without a cap.
Proposition 2 Given any t, prices are lower and output higher in sector 2 with output-based
allocation than with adjusted trade.
Proof. Suppose instead QA
2 = QB






2 , the adjustment factor that holds overall
8Suppose the price were lower and output higher—then ¯ e would fall and the net tax would imply the price must
be higher than autarky. If the price were higher, then lower output would imply a higher average allocation and a net
subsidy, which would mean the price must be lower than autarky. Therefore, if ¯ µ is the prevailing emission rate, ¯ e =¯ µ
must be the average allocation.17
emissions constant. Then both price equations simplify to
P2 = c2(µ2)+t(µ2 − ¯ µQ2/Q
B
2 )
However, the equilibrium emissions rate cannot be the same under the adjustment policy as under
OBA, since for any t, the trade adjustment implies a different permit price in sector 2. Since µB
2
is optimal under OBA, and µA
2 6= µB
2 , then costs must be higher with µA
2 : 0 >c 2(µB






2 . Thus, it must be that prices are lower and output higher in the rate-based
sector with OBA than with adjusted trade.
In other words, the inefﬁciency of the adjustment mechanism lowers gains from trade and
raises costs. The incidence of the cost differential would be distributed somewhat, since (assuming
α is adjusted optimally) the allocation subsidy is somewhat larger (though not enough to offset the
higher costs completely), and the permit price adjusts as well.
The impact on the market price for permits depends on the net impact on emissions in sector 2.





2 .L e tu sa s s u m e ,a si sl i k e l y ,t h ee m i s s i o n sr a t ee f f e c td o m i n a t e s
the output effect. Then emissions in sector 2 are higher with adjusted trade than with OBA, and
it does not export as many permits. Consequently, sector 1 must abate more than with OBA and
the equilibrium permit price must be higher: tA >t B. If, on the other hand, t2 >t B >t 1;t h e n
µA
2 <µ B
2 when tA = tB. Lower emissions mean less demand to import from sector 1, which drives
down the market price compared with the OBA scenario, so tA >t B. In other words, the permit
price will remain closer to sector 1’s autarky price with adjusted trade than with OBA, since not
all the gains from trade will be dissipated.
In all scenarios, no rents exist in sector 2; they are completely dissipated to consumers. The
lowest prices—and thereby the highest consumer surplus— in that sector occur with OBA, then
adjusted trade with TPS, then no trade. For sector 1, production costs are increasing with the
permit price, but so is the value of the emissions allocation. The net effect of a change in the18
permit price then depends on the extent to which sector 1 is a net importer or exporter of permits:
dTS1/dt = −Q1dP1/dt+ ¯ E = ¯ E−µ1Q1.I ft1 >t 2, then sector 1 wants to import; since tA >t B
in that case, it suffers from the higher price from adjusted trade. If t2 >t 1 and sector 1 wants to
export permits, the fact that tA <t B m e a n st h a ti tp r o ﬁts less from adjusted trade. Thus, sector 1
will tend to prefer that sector 2 choose OBA as well. Either form of trade, however, is preferred to
n ot r a d eb yb o t hs e c t o r s .
4.3 Tightening the Cap
Finally, the CAT regulator could also offset the effects of trade on emissions by simply tightening
the cap in sector 1; let us denote this equilibrium with superscript C. The new lump-sum allocation
would be ¯ E − ¯ µ(QC
2 − Q2).
The TPS sector would undoubtedly be better off in this scenario, since it retains a larger allo-
cation than with OBA. A consequence of this bigger subsidy is that product prices will be lower
in the rate-based sector, and the expansion of outp u ti m p l i e st h a tp e r m i tp r i c e sm u s tb eh i g h e rt o
compensate.
Proposition 3 Given any t, prices are lower and output higheri ns e c t o r2w i t har e d u c t i o ni nt h e
cap for sector 1 than with output-based allocation for sector 2 (PC
2 <P B
2 ).
Proof. This follows directly from ¯ e<¯ µ,s i n c ePC
2 = c(µ)+t(µ − ¯ µ) <c (µ)+t(µ − ¯ e)=PB
2 .
Corollary 4 Permit prices are higher with a reduction in the cap for sector 1 than with output-
based allocation for sector 2 (tC >t B).
Proof. Suppose tC = tB;t h e n¯ e<¯ µ implies Q2 >Q B
2 ,w h i l eµ1 = µB
1 , µ2 = µB
2 ,a n dQ1 = QB
1 .
Then total emissions are greater than the cap (µB
1 QB
1 + µB




2 = ¯ E +¯ µQ2),
which cannot be an equilibrium. Thus, demand for permits is higher and permit prices must rise
(tC >t B) to encourage more abatement and output shifting until the cap is met.19
In other words, part of the incidence of the larger subsidy will reveal itself in higher permit
prices and lower emissions rates in both sectors, to temper the effect of greater output in sector 2.
However, the CAT sector may not be better off with trade under the tighter cap than with adjusted
trade with the permit exchange rate. This depends on whether the value of the reduction in the
allocation is greater than the gains from unrestricted trade. Since the change in surplus depends on














1 +( tC − tA) ¯ E − tC¯ µ(Q
C
2 − Q2)
∼ = (tC − tA)(µ
C
2 − ¯ µ)Q
C
2 − tC¯ µ(Q
C
2 − Q2),
where we can see the sign depends on the relative magnitudes of the effects on permit prices,
emissions rates, and output in sector 2.
If the allocation reduction is indeed larger, proposing a permit exhange rate regime will be
a credible policy threat for country 1, which would be an inducement to country 2 to accept a
tightening of its own standard. The existence of gains from trade also reveals that both sectors
could be made better off with some combinations of tightening both the cap and the standard.
5C o n c l u s i o n
Decisionmakers around the world are voicing commitments to formulate policies to reduce green-
house gas emissions using market-based mechanisms. Tradable emissions permit systems have
long been lauded by economists for their ability to achieve environmental goals at least cost and
maximum ﬂexibility. However, putting a price on emissions means that whoever is given the initial
right to the remaining emissions has a valuable asset, and allocating that asset can be a difﬁcult
political decision. If the government owns it, it gains valuable revenues; if incumbent ﬁrms own
i t ,t h e yg a i np r o ﬁtable rents; and if they are distributed in proportion to output, consumers gain, at
least in part. Furthermore, the initial goal of a tradable permit system can differ: a cap-and-trade20
system targets a ﬁxed emissions goal, while a tradable performance standard targets an average
emissions intensity. These issues are exempliﬁed in the current EU climate policy proposal for
European emissions trading: member countries are directed to allocate their emissions allowances
gratis, though each may determine by what method, and intensity mechanisms are allowed as well
as emissions caps.
When two different emissions trading programs attempt to deal with the same pollution prob-
lem, like global warming, overall costs can be lowered by allowing trade between them. However,
certain problems are posed when the programs differ in their design. Without some policy of ad-
justment or a switch to a ﬁxed cap, allowing trade between a rate-based emissions program and
a cap-and-trade program will tend to lead to an expansion of overall emissions. This expansion
occurs regardless of the direction in which trade occurs when demand for the products of the two
sectors is unrelated. If the product markets are strongly related, then emissions will still expand if
the output price of a CAT competitor falls with cheaper permit imports, or if the output price of a
complementary producer under a CAT rises with valuable permit exports.
When a goal of integration is to keep emissions from expanding, adjustments have to be made
to offset the changes in allocation in the rate-based sector. Though the allocation changes could be
done in either sector, or outside the system by governing authorities, it may be that holding emis-
sions constant under trade is the mandate of the cap-and-trade sector. Jurisdictional differences
may then require a policy that can be implemented unilaterally. An indirect tax on the products
of the sector with rate-based regulation could be designed to hold output, and thereby emission
allocations, constant under trade. An output tax would not distort incentives to reduce emissions
rates either. However, such a tax would be difﬁcult, if not illegal, to levy across jurisdictions. A
permit exchange rate could also be set to expropriate additional allocations in the rate-based sector.
This policy could be set by the regulator of the cap-and-trade sector, but some of the potential gains
from trade would be forgone because marginal abatement costs would not be equalized. Further-
more, like the necessary output tax, this adjustment factor would be hard to predict and therefore
difﬁcult to administer. Finally, one could merely reduce the cap by the increase in the other sector’s21
allocation; however, this reduction in permit assets may outweigh the additional gains from trade
to the CAT sector compared with adjusted trade, and therefore may not be acceptable.
Unsurprisingly, the simplest way to hold overall emissions constant is to have the TPS sector
switch to a cap. More interesting is that switching to a ﬁxed emissions cap with output-based
allocation leads to lower consumer prices in that sector than if an adjustment policy is imposed.
Thus, if earmarking emissions rents to the affected sector is important, the rate-based sector should
actually prefer an output-allocated cap to a performance standard with a permit exchange rate. In
general, the incentives for abatement are also more efﬁcient, since the permit price is equalized
across sectors.9 The improved efﬁciency and larger gains from trade lead to higher combined gains
in the cap-and-trade sector as well with output-allocated permits compared with an adjustment
policy.
From a true welfare standpoint, though, it will be important to understand the market failures
that drive the choice of rate-based allocations in the ﬁrst place. General equilibrium effects can
be especially important for welfare analysis, and they would have to be modeled carefully for
the problem at hand: whether affected sectors trading in permits are small or large relative to the
economy, whether their product markets are interdependent, whether permit trade occurs across
countries, what the scope is for leakage to unregulated polluters, what the alternative uses of the
revenues would be, and whether policymakers maximize welfare or are subject to political con-
straints. These factors will affect the desirability of different allocation policies. However, the
main result remains: allowing trade between a cap-and-trade system and a tradable performance
standard program requires some form of poli c ya d j u s t m e n tt ok e e pe m i s s i o n ss t a b l e .
9An exception might be if output substitution opportunities are an important means of emissions reduction in sector
2, but that tends to make rate-based policies less attractive in the ﬁrst place.22
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